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Is Revelation in the World?
S A M U E L M O Y N
ONE OF THE MOST pivotal moments of Peter Eli Gordon’s masterful
Rosenzweig and Heidegger occurs when, late in its pages and at long last, he
turns to the fact that its titular protagonists were not just Jew and Ger-
man, artificially divided from one another by the vagaries of later history.
They were also theist and atheist: one believed in God and the other did
not. And each staked out his commitment for or against religion early in
life in an event indissociably biographical and theoretical. Heidegger’s
adamant denial of God’s existence and Rosenzweig’s lifelong allegiance
to the revelatory divine were bound up with the core purposes and pro-
gram of each, undoubtedly driving life and work as fundamentally as any
other single commitment. Gordon’s text succeeds as well as it does—and
there is no question about its overall success—by framing matters as if
mainly ethnic, cultural, and political sympathies had led to the division
unthinkingly inserted between his figures; this division’s undoing is re-
quired by disinterested historical study that reveals the anachronism of
those retrospective judgments. But what if the true rift between the fig-
ures were not imposed after the fact, a construction of later interpretation
and ethnic demarcation, but one that a true measurement of resemblance
and difference must place center stage?
So it is with considerable drama that Gordon finally turns to the appar-
ently harsh reality that Heidegger disavowed God while Rosenzweig af-
firmed him. And his confrontation with it is both intriguing and
misleading. Overall, Gordon wants to claim that Rosenzweig’s concept of
redemption as ‘‘redemption-in-the-world’’—collective and historical in its
parameters, holist and temporalized in its ontological basis, and structur-
ally proleptic in its ultimate promise—in effect comes near to making
Rosenzweig the very sort of atheistic theologian he began his career crit-
icizing. Throughout his book, Gordon is most interested in those mo-
ments in Rosenzweig’s corpus which allow him to be presented as a
charter member of the German philosophical tradition, especially as un-
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derstood, after Immanuel Kant, as a quest for a philosophy of the conditions
of human experience of the world from the inside. The God of Rosenzweig’s
theism, for Gordon, must accommodate himself to these conditions, and
therefore Rosenzweig verges on a philosophy that no traditional or sus-
tainable God-concept can withstand. It is not so clear why the articula-
tion of a new God-concept would verge on unbelief, but Gordon wants,
nevertheless, to argue that as a result of its ‘‘Heideggerian’’ commitments
Rosenzweig’s thought ‘‘stood in uncomfortable proximity to the atheism
it denied’’ (p. 234). Gordon already advertises in his introduction that if
Rosenzweig’s goal is to update theology no less than philosophy, in part
by grounding theology in a new philosophy, then it is not evident that the
‘‘obvious prominence of theological materials’’ in his thought by itself
wrecks a comparison with an equally novel atheism. Anyway, what if the
prominence of Heidegger’s atheism in fact obscures a raft of theological
commitments encrypted in it? ‘‘It remains to be seen just how significant
[the] contrast really is,’’ Gordon therefore says (p. 37). And when he in
the end comes to treat the problem frontally, he acknowledges that ‘‘any
comparison that did not take cognizance of their disagreement concern-
ing theism and atheism would be neglecting a crucial topic.’’ The point
once again, in nearly identical language, is ‘‘to understand what kind of
disagreement it really is’’ (p. 232).
Yet Gordon’s treatment of the question, tantalizing as it is, ends up
ignoring the large body of evidence most revealing about and challenging
to his overall comparison; and seeing how suggests a useful perspective
from which to reread his book. For what is missing throughout the study
is quite simply one of Rosenzweig’s central themes: revelation. Put
briefly, then, my claim is that with equal if potentially contradictory fer-
vor, Rosenzweig also wanted to craft a theology of God’s creation of the world
and revelation to it from the outside. Restituting the post-idealist conditions
of human interpretation and experience counts as only part of Rosen-
zweig’s self-imposed task, and if Gordon’s claim is that these two missions
simply cannot coexist, then that fact does not make Rosenzweig more like
Heidegger but less so (even when the latter is interpreted as internalizing
to philosophy a theology he officially disclaimed). Put differently, and
more positively and constructively, Gordon’s study not only helps isolate
how Rosenzweig differed in the end from Heidegger but what the nodal
points of Rosenzweig’s philosophy were considered all by itself.
And yet, Rosenzweig and Heidegger refuses to reach this conclusion, and
it is interesting to see how and why. After all, Gordon does not intention-
ally take his book in the direction I am suggesting. In fact, the omission
of Rosenzweig’s theology from Gordon’s book is rather glaring when one
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comes to think of it. In form, it offers itself as a historical narrative of the
‘‘chief stages’’ (p. xxviii) of Rosenzweig’s trajectory. But one finds noth-
ing about Rosenzweig’s formative association with his theological friends
Hans Ehrenberg and Eugen Rosenstock, and his choice of revelation
against relativism in the renaissance of contemporary theology that also
indelibly marked Rosenzweig’s early career. The chief testament of this
period, Rosenzweig’s essay ‘‘Atheistic Theology,’’ does not really figure in
Gordon’s argument. And then one comes to Gordon’s lengthy and loving
treatment of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. Again, revelation is left out.
It is neither analytically marginalized nor controversially interpreted: it
is simply omitted. But in the central section of his book, on revelation,
Rosenzweig hoped to show his continuing allegiance to his early theologi-
cal friends who had tutored him on the importance of the revelatory God
lost in the nineteenth century, thereby making good on his demand in
‘‘Atheistic Theology’’ for a theology that genuinely deserved the name.
The question is therefore whether and how the seemingly different but
very real Rosenzweig of ‘‘Atheistic Theology’’ and the core of The Star
fits into a portrait limned in his absence. To understand the nature of
Rosenzweig’s harmony and dissonance with Heidegger, what kind of dis-
agreement there really is between them, in any case, seems to require
acknowledgment and analysis of this material too.
Now for corrective, expository, or strategic purposes there is nothing
in itself wrong with the choice to focus selectively on the set of unex-
pected affinities that, as Gordon shows, unites Rosenzweig and Heideg-
ger, to the detriment of whatever might divide them. (In his exposition of
The Star, which concentrates on one-ninth of that text, Gordon openly
and justifiably eschews the design of comprehensive exposition [p. 121].)
But revelation is not simply a theme postponed in Gordon’s book, whose
status it leaves in abeyance, for Gordon clearly believes his book has
serious implications for its treatment; the trouble is that his suggestions
in this regard fail to convince and indeed participate in the analytical
suppression of revelation rather than finally facing up to the challenge it
poses.
Gordon’s late confrontation with his protagonist’s theism, in which he
touches on Rosenzweig’s portrait of a temporal God from late in The Star,
approaches and avoids the problem in an especially revealing way (p.
205). For is it really plausible to rest the case about the significance of
the contrast between the atheism of the one thinker with the theism of
the other on a comparison of the one’s ‘‘authenticity’’ with the other’s
‘‘redemption,’’ given how centrally revelation figured not simply in Rosen-
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zweig’s thought generally but also in The Star quite specifically, and how
different that theme makes Rosenzweig’s thought look from any atheist
doctrine? From an architectonic and evidentiary perspective, because of
the sheer prominence of revelation in The Star and throughout Rosen-
zweig’s writings (a prominence never mentioned), Gordon’s discussion is
rather like comparing two items but excluding from the comparison what
the casual and superficial observer would take as their most obvious and
flagrant difference. It is suggestive to remark that Rosenzweig’s redemp-
tion is like Heidegger’s authenticity. But how could that argument possi-
bly save oneself the trouble of even acknowledging Rosenzweig’s
commitment to revelation—one whose equivalent is either impossible or
much more difficult to locate in Heidegger’s thought?
So Gordon’s disposition of the challenge of Rosenzweig’s fervent the-
ism at the end of Rosenzweig and Heidegger is both hasty and puzzling. In
the brief section that otherwise comes closest to the topic of revelation,
Gordon’s strategy, deployed but not defended, is to infer conclusions
about Rosenzweig’s views on divine revelation (which Rosenzweig in a
long theological tradition defined as love) from conclusions about Rosen-
zweig’s views of human relations. Citing an important passage from Ro-
senzweig’s recently published correspondence with Margrit Rosenstock-
Huessy to the effect that ‘‘love does not overstep the bounds of life,’’
Gordon says this means that ‘‘love remains on the level of factical action’’
(p. 203, n. 15). In a more recent writing, Gordon cites this letter to
‘‘Gritli’’ again and repeats his conclusion: ‘‘In The Star, either the ‘face’ of
the other is experienced as being-in-the-world or it cannot be experienced
at all.’’1 In both cases, however, Gordon is taking his conclusion as his
premise: he writes as if a general comparison of Rosenzweig with Heideg-
ger meant that the latter’s vocabulary were straightforwardly applicable
to the specific problem of Rosenzweig’s views about revelation. But that
assumption begs the precise question at issue. What of Rosenzweig’s an-
nounced intent to find a divine standard outside the vagaries of wayward
human history and interpretation? What of the fact that The Star balances
its portrait of human finitude with an insistence on divine infinity? What
of the fact that its theology relies everywhere and insists strenuously upon
a category difference between God’s revelatory love and interpersonal
affection? And that Rosenzweig presents the former as the source of or
1. Peter Eli Gordon, ‘‘Franz Rosenzweig and the Philosophy of Jewish Exis-
tence,’’ The Cambridge Companion to Modern Jewish Thought, ed. M. Morgan (Cam-
bridge, forthcoming).
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template for the latter?2 If he calls neighborly relations ‘‘love in the
world,’’ does that not mean that the revelatory love from which they are
explicitly derived is not wholly so? In summary, didn’t Rosenzweig reject
exactly the project Gordon attributes to him—in Rosenzweig’s words,
the ‘‘attempt at a resolute transformation of Judaism into something this-
worldly’’?3
While these questions might suggest a quite different Rosenzweig than
one finds in Gordon’s book, my chief point is about how surprisingly far-
reaching Gordon’s claims are given the selectivity of his focus and evi-
dence. If this argument is plausible, an alternative follows. It might be
possible for Gordon to extend his case to surmount the most difficult
obstacle to the claim that Rosenzweig verged inadvertently on the rejec-
tion of his own fervent theism—‘‘on a wholly temporalized and immanent
theory,’’ one ‘‘without room’’ for revelation (p. 222 n. 45). But a very
different way is also paved, one might argue, a way toward an even more
novel and fundamental consideration of Rosenzweig’s doctrine. Is revela-
tion, too, in the world? No question goes more directly to the heart—and
perhaps the tensions—of Rosenzweig’s project. And yet if it is a real ac-
complishment of Gordon’s book to allow the question to be posed and
faced in its true complexity, the book also leaves out the materials that
would allow for it to be answered.
Since the publication of his book, it bears noting, Gordon has subtly
altered his view, in effect acknowledging the partiality of his original
reading, as well as the spectacular contest of energies in Rosenzweig’s
thought that the comparison with Heidegger fails by itself to capture.
‘‘Rosenzweig shared a great deal with the Protestant crisis-theologians of
the 1920s (e.g., Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich Gogarten),’’
he writes.
Drawing inspiration from Kierkegaard, these passionately religious
thinkers shared in common the fear that historicist contextualism ran
the risk of neutralizing revelation. But it is remarkable to see how Ro-
senzweig’s magnum opus, The Star tries almost desperately to render
revelation compatible with the author’s own historicist commitments.
In the central chapter on revelation, Rosenzweig seeks to explain how
God, the ‘‘metaphysical,’’ can appear to humanity. But if a divine mani-
2. Whether this position is contradicted by the letter Gordon cites is a ques-
tion with which I cannot deal in these remarks, the point of which is to suggest
the omission of evidence rather than where exactly it points.
3. Franz Rosenzweig, ‘‘Atheistische Theologie,’’ Kleinere Schriften (Berlin, 1937),
289.
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festation can be intelligible within the bounds of human experience, it
must assume a place in history as well. Revelation, Rosenzweig con-
cludes, thus finds its highest ‘‘certainty’’ not as a phenomenon incom-
mensurable with history, but rather, precisely ‘‘in’’ our Geschichtlichkeit,
or ‘‘historicity.’’ This is an intriguing claim, and it is evidence of a
thinker who can abandon neither religious transcendence nor the his-
toricist doctrine that threatens to dissolve it.4
In these few lines, Gordon has said more—quite literally—about the exis-
tence and prominence of revelation in Rosenzweig’s thought than in his
earlier book. Note, however, that even in what one might legitimately
read as a self-correction the threat is still from temporal holism and col-
lectivist historicism to Rosenzweig’s theism, as if the reverse relationship
were not possible, as if those commitments were not themselves under
threat from revelation. Put differently, there is still a curious asymmetry,
still an insistence that holism is the ‘‘core’’ view and revelation is some-
thing Rosenzweig has to try ‘‘desperately’’ to make compatible with it.
The truth is that he strained just as much the other way. Neither view is
at the core—or both views are. Similarly, while Gordon argues in the
book, as noted, that Rosenzweig ‘‘verged’’ on full temporalization of God,
he elsewhere acknowledges in passing that ‘‘Rosenzweig is . . . careful to
indicate that there is an aspect of divine being that is wholly dissociated
from time’’ (p. 190). So why does Rosenzweig not equally ‘‘verge’’ on the
rejection of temporal holism, too? The fact that Heidegger himself went
all the way is no answer. And so the bias persists even in the attempt to
correct it.
The dispute, seemingly scholastic, actually goes to the heart of Rosen-
zweig’s thought—and of the course of modern Jewish philosophy.
Clearly, Gordon’s overextension of his comparison to Heidegger as if it
obviously covered Rosenzweig’s theory of revelation too, with the need
for little further argument, follows mainly from his plausible interest in
freeing up Rosenzweig from Emmanuel Levinas’s interpretive legacy,
which has recently come to pervade scholarship on the subject (pp. xxi,
9–11, 132, 199, etc.). Gordon’s aim of showing Rosenzweig to be pro-
pounding a theory of temporal holism, as Heidegger did, makes him par-
ticularly devoted to emphasizing the distance between that theory and
any claim that intersubjectivity involves an otherworldly encounter with
4. Gordon’s ‘‘Angelus Novus,’’ a review of David N. Myers, Resisting History:
Historicism and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought (Princeton, N. J., 2003),
JQR 95.4 (2005): 760.
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the exterior face of the other in all his transcendent alterity. This denial
is the impulse, indeed, of much of Gordon’s book. But the terms and zeal
of the correction obviate seeing how the mistake itself originally occurred.
Did Levinas’s thought simply come out of nowhere, as a wholesale fabri-
cation? Far from authorizing the conclusions Gordon suggests, the expul-
sion of revelation from consideration—or the passing suggestion that
revelation either fits with Rosenzweig’s ‘‘Heideggerian commitments’’ or
drops out—obscures why Levinas could have read Rosenzweig the way
he did (drawing not on Rosenzweig’s ‘‘ethics’’ but precisely on his theory
of revelation). Finally, Gordon’s marginalization of revelation equally ob-
scures how the thinking of Leo Strauss, who recognized perhaps better
than anyone the existentialist and non-existentialist (modernist and ar-
chaic) elements in Rosenzweig’s thought, could likewise have flowed
from the same source.5
Only one question remains. Why the partiality? Why the marginaliza-
tion of revelation? The glaring selectivity of Gordon’s reading forces the
question, and I will share my own proposed response. Gordon’s choice to
push Rosenzweig in the direction of Heidegger’s doctrine to or past the
limits the evidence allows is unintelligible except as a reflection of Gor-
don’s own constructive rather than historical commitments, as a Jew and
as a philosopher. Rosenzweig and Heidegger turns out to contain, just below
the surface but explaining the agenda and shape of the whole, a profession
de foi in which Judaism is offered as either most defensible or only plausi-
ble (or both) if it is compatible with Heideggerian existentialism—and
vice versa. The explanation, in other words, is Gordon’s commitment to
many aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy as having persuasively left prior
paradigms of thought behind, and in light of which, and in tune with
which, Rosenzweig is in effect credited for updating the Jewish faith.
The end result is the startling claim that Heidegger’s thought turns out to
be Judaic, with Heidegger prostrating himself before ‘‘a possibly Hebraic
god’’ (p. 314).
It is not just that this surprising concatenation only results thanks to a
fundamentally one-sided view of Rosenzweig’s overall endeavor (Gor-
don’s approach to Heidegger’s thought is also selective in ways that are
both inevitable and illuminating). The very one-sidedness demands re-
5. I acknowledge, of course, the difficulty of the comparative study I recom-
mend. Nevertheless, I have taken a stab at it in my book Origins of the Other:
Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics (Ithaca, N. Y., 2005), esp. chap. 4.
On Strauss, see Moyn, ‘‘From Experience to Law: Leo Strauss and the Weimar
Crisis of the Philosophy of Religion,’’ The Early Leo Strauss, ed. P. Bouretz and E.
Sheppard (forthcoming).
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flection on what accounts for the shape of the book as it stands, and more
generally on the alternative between historicism and constructivism in
interpretation. Unlike the readings he combats, Gordon’s work, it is true,
constructs an identity by collapsing the wall others have erected between
Jewish thought and the German philosophical experience.6 It rejects a
‘‘revelatory model’’ of tradition in the name of a creative and inventive
model (pp. 1, 313). But creativity is not just past but present. The histori-
cist restoration of Rosenzweig to ‘‘the horizon of German thought’’ is not
just a heuristic device of restitution; it is also an engine for the reinvention
of tradition. It makes it possible for Heidegger to worship a Hebraic god;
and, perhaps more important, it makes it possible for a Jew as a Jew to
kneel with Heidegger before the same altar. If the reinvention of Judaism
attributed to Rosenzweig and conducted in the text comes at the appar-
ently steep price of its new proximity to atheist unbelief, Heidegger’s
inclusion in the ‘‘tradition’’ at least strengthens its intellectual plausibility.
I should state forthrightly, in closing, that I have a stake neither in the
search for the true doctrine of the faith—Heideggerian or other—nor in
the insulation of a putatively objective historical standard of interpreta-
tion from such a search. I wholly concur with Gordon’s ultimate acknowl-
edgment that historical investigation is inexpungeably constructive:
‘‘Interpretation is a deeply interested activity, guided by personal . . .
concerns’’ (p. 303). Nevertheless, the text has some autonomy, and there
are also limits to interpretation. As a historian, I am permitted to worry
that the terms of fusion of historicism and constructivism to be found in
Gordon’s eloquent and provocative work leave out, or distort, the drama
and passion of the thought that his interpretation is forced to partially
reinvent for it to be carried out and to be made to seem plausible. Just as
important, it obscures the sources of later Jewish philosophy. And yet, I
am fortunate that apparently serious differences are of little moment to
Peter Gordon—especially so, I hope, when they are born of a friendship
dear and deep enough to thrive on debate. He will explain what kind of
disagreement this one, too, ‘‘really is.’’
6. Gordon, ‘‘Rosenzweig Redux: The Reception of German Jewish Thought,’’
Jewish Social Studies 18.1 (2001): 22, cf. 43–44.
